Calsamiglia, X., & Kirman, A. P. (1993). A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes. Econometrica, 61, 1147-1173.
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Cita Chicago Style (17a ed.)
Calsamiglia, Xavier, y Alan P. Kirman. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes."
Econometrica 61 (1993): 1147-1173.
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Cita MLA (9a ed.)
Calsamiglia, Xavier, y Alan P. Kirman. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes."
Econometrica, vol. 61, 1993, pp. 1147-1173.
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