Poblete, J., & Spulber, D. (Summer2012). The form of incentive contracts: Agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), 43(2), 215-235.
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Cita Chicago Style (17a ed.)
Poblete, Joaquín, y Daniel Spulber. "The Form of Incentive Contracts: Agency with Moral Hazard, Risk Neutrality, and Limited Liability."
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) 43, no. 2 (Summer2012): 215-235.
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Cita MLA (9a ed.)
Poblete, Joaquín, y Daniel Spulber. "The Form of Incentive Contracts: Agency with Moral Hazard, Risk Neutrality, and Limited Liability."
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), vol. 43, no. 2, Summer2012, pp. 215-235.
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