Cita APA (7a ed.)
HAMMOND, R. G., & MORRILL, T. (2014). STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS. Economic Inquiry, 52(3), 1219-1231.
Cita Chicago Style (17a ed.)
HAMMOND, ROBERT G., y THAYER MORRILL. "STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS." Economic Inquiry 52, no. 3 (2014): 1219-1231.
Cita MLA (9a ed.)
HAMMOND, ROBERT G., y THAYER MORRILL. "STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS." Economic Inquiry, vol. 52, no. 3, 2014, pp. 1219-1231.
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