REVIZIONISTINIS KONSTRUKTYVIOJO EMPIRIZMO NORMATYVUMAS.

What is the nature and epistemic status of contemporary scientific knowledge? And, more generally, how is rational cognition possible at all? In the contemporary philosophy of science these questions are primarily tackled in the debates between empiricism and scientific realism. It seems that Bas va...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos pp. 48 - 62
Autores principales: Bujokas, Justas, Šaulauskas, Marius Povilas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2014 Supplement
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: 2014 Supplement
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      pub: Vilnius University
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        10.15388/problemos.2014.0.4924
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        atl: REVIZIONISTINIS KONSTRUKTYVIOJO EMPIRIZMO NORMATYVUMAS.
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          Bujokas, Justas
          Šaulauskas, Marius Povilas
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto, Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius
      sug:
      keyword:
        agneology
        axiology
        constructive empiricism
        epistemology
        scientific practice
        agneologija
        agneology
        aksiologija
        axiology
        constructive empiricism
        epistemologija
        epistemology
        konstruktyvusis empirizmas
        mokslo praktika
        scientific practice
      ab:
        What is the nature and epistemic status of contemporary scientific knowledge? And, more generally, how is rational cognition possible at all? In the contemporary philosophy of science these questions are primarily tackled in the debates between empiricism and scientific realism. It seems that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (CE) serves as the most important version of the longstanding British empirical tradition nowadays. The paper both draws on and contributes to the critical points of the argumentation of van Fraassen, Gideon Rosen and Marc Alspector-Kelly by offering a new version of normative interpretation of CE. It is argued that epistemological normativity is implicated in all versions of CE and should be understood not only as inevitable but also heuristically useful. Inevitable, because the fact/value dichotomy is not absolute as it follows from the critical evaluation of the basic arguments under consideration in terms of irreducible ambiguity of CE and of the methodological premises this ambiguity implies. Heuristically useful, because the implied flexible normativity of CE, in comparison with rigid ontological postulates of scientific realism, offers epistemologically more modest and descriptively more copious conception of science encompassing the vast multitude of ever-changing epistemic, normative and axiological practices. And, at the end of the day, the heuristic potential of CE is warranted by the moderate agneological revision of modern knowledge that CE, being an outspoken version of modern philosophy of science, cannot but engage with.
        Santrauka. Kokia nūdienio mokslo prigimtis, koks jo pažintinis statusas? Ir dar plačiau: ar ir kaip įmanomas racionalus žinojimas? Šie klausimai nūdienos mokslo filosofijoje sprendžiami visų pirma empirizmo ir mokslinio realizmo ginčuose. Bene ryškiausia šiuolaikinio britų empirizmo forma -- Baso van Fraasseno konstruktyvusis empirizmas, arba tiksliau konstruktyvusis empiricizmas (KE). Straipsnyje, remiantis ir ginčijant visų pirma van Fraasseno, Gideono Roseno ir Marco Alspector-Kelly argumentaciją, pateikiama revizionistinio KE normatyvumo samprata. Tvirtinama, kad KE epistemologijoje implicitiškai slypintis normatyvumas yra (a) neišvengiamas ir (b) euristiškai naudingas. Neišvengiamas, nes pati deskripcijos ir normos dichotomija nėra absoliuti. Būtent tai visų pirma atskleidžia van Fraasseno ir Roseno diskusijos analizė KE daugiaprasmiškumo bei jo diktuojamų metodologinių nuostatų terminais. Euristiškai naudingas, nes lankstusis KE normatyvumas, lyginant jį su rigidiškais mokslinio realizmo ontologiniais postulatais, siūlo epistemologiškai nuosaikesnę ir empiriškai adekvatesnę mokslo sampratą, apimančią nuolat kintančių episteminių, normatyvinių ir aksiologinių praktikų įvairovės visumą. Šio euristinio KE potencialo sąlyga galų gale yra KE vykdoma nuosaikioji agneologinio moderniojo mokslinio žinojimo revizija lygiai tiek, kiek jis yra moderniosios filosofijos atmaina.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: Lithuanian
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