ASMENS TAPATUMAS BE ASMENS IR BE TAPATUMO.
The paper argues that theories of psychological continuity destroy themselves from within due to insufficient and unreliable methodological assumptions, hence personal identity is left without a person and an identity. It is claimed that thought experiments, being a necessary methodological means fo...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos pp. 62 - 70 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2014 Supplement
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=100424170&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 100424170 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2014 Supplement pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 100424170 10.15388/problemos.2014.0.4925 ppf: 62 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: ASMENS TAPATUMAS BE ASMENS IR BE TAPATUMO. aug: au: Žalgirytė, Jolita affil: Vilniaus universiteto, Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius sug: keyword: biological organism brain transplantation conceptual analysis personal identity thought experiments asmens tapatumas asmuo biological organism biologinis organizmas brain transplantation conceptual analysis konceptualinė sąvokų analizė mintiniai eksperimentai personal identity smegenų transplantacija thought experiments ab: The paper argues that theories of psychological continuity destroy themselves from within due to insufficient and unreliable methodological assumptions, hence personal identity is left without a person and an identity. It is claimed that thought experiments, being a necessary methodological means for establishing the existence of persons, are both insufficient and unreliable. Two arguments are presented. First, thought experiments presuppose conceptual possibility of distinctness and separation of a person and a biological organism, but the direct application of such possibility is not reliable due to subjective description of the thought experiment and lack of independent arguments. Second, two different interpretations of the same thought experiment (the brain transplantation case) yield conceptually possible, albeit contrary and thus ontologically incompatible, conclusions. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kad psichologinio tęstinumo teorijos pačios save sugriauna iš vidaus dėl nepakankamų ir nepatikimų metodologinių prielaidų, todėl asmens tapatumas lieka be asmens ir be tapatumo. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad mintiniai eksperimentai, laikomi būtina metodologine priemone asmens egzistavimo ontologijai, yra ir nepakankami, ir nepatikimi. Pateikiami du argumentai: pirma, mintiniai eksperimentai numato konceptualinę asmens ir biologinio organizmo skirtingumo ir atskiriamumo galimybę, tačiau tiesioginis tokios galimybės pritaikymas tikrovėje nėra patikimas dėl subjektyvaus mintinio eksperimento aprašymo ir nepriklausomų argumentų trūkumo, antra, iš to paties mintinio eksperimento dviejų skirtingų interpretacijų gaunamos konceptualiai galimos, tačiau priešingos, vadinasi, ir ontologiškai nesuderinamos išvados (padalintų smegenų persodinimo atvejis). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Lithuanian refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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