Rules and Principles in Moral Decision Making: An Empirical Objection to Moral Particularism.
It is commonly thought that moral rules and principles, such as 'Keep your promises,' 'Respect autonomy,' and 'Distribute goods according to need (merit, etc.),' should play an essential role in our moral deliberation. Particularists have challenged this view by arguing that principled guidance lead...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 18; no. 1; pp. 123 - 135 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=100632568&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 100632568 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2015 vid: 18 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 100632568 10.1007/s10677-014-9514-z ppf: 123 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 177KB tig: atl: Rules and Principles in Moral Decision Making: An Empirical Objection to Moral Particularism. aug: au: Zamzow, Jennifer affil: Department of Philosophy and Center for Ethics and Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Baker Hall 135 Pittsburgh 15213 USA su: Moral judgment Ethical decision making Expert evidence Ethics research Deliberation Ethics sug: subj: Moral judgment Ethical decision making Expert evidence Ethics research Deliberation Ethics keyword: Empirical Experts Moral judgments Moral principles Moral rules Particularism ab: It is commonly thought that moral rules and principles, such as 'Keep your promises,' 'Respect autonomy,' and 'Distribute goods according to need (merit, etc.),' should play an essential role in our moral deliberation. Particularists have challenged this view by arguing that principled guidance leads us to engage in worse decision making because principled guidance is too rigid and it leads individuals to neglect or distort relevant details. However, when we examine empirical literature on the use of rules and principles in other domains, we find that people can learn to use rules discriminately and that rule-based models tend to outperform even expert judgment. I argue that this evidence poses a problem for the moral particularist. If the particularist claims that we should not rely on decision-making rules when making practical decisions and it turns out that these rules help us make better decisions, then the particularists' prescriptive account is deficient. However, if the particularist claims that we should rely on practical decision-making rules but not on moral rules, she needs to explain how practical rules are different from moral rules and why we should rely on the former but not the latter. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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