A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state.
Property-owning democracies combine the regulative and redistributive functions of the welfare state with the governmental aim of ensuring that wealth and capital are widely dispersed. John Rawls, political philosophy's most famous property-owning democrat, argued that property-owning democracy was...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 2; pp. 283 - 305 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=100748950&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 100748950 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2015 vid: 172 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 100748950 10.1007/s11098-014-0303-2 ppf: 283 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 236KB tig: atl: A moral and economic critique of the new property-owning democrats: on behalf of a Rawlsian welfare state. aug: au: Vallier, Kevin affil: Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green USA su: Democracy Capital Wealth Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Political philosophy United States sug: subj: United States Democracy Capital Wealth Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Political philosophy keyword: Economic justice Ideal theory John Rawls Property-owning democracy Welfare states ab: Property-owning democracies combine the regulative and redistributive functions of the welfare state with the governmental aim of ensuring that wealth and capital are widely dispersed. John Rawls, political philosophy's most famous property-owning democrat, argued that property-owning democracy was one of two regime types that best realized his two principles of justice, though he was notoriously vague about how a property-owning democracy's institutions are meant to realize his principles. To compensate for this deficiency, a number of Rawlsian political philosophers have tried to add institutional and policy content to the idea. While their efforts have advanced the discussion, few have criticized the soundness of these attempts. This article attempts to fill the void. I claim that, in comparison to welfare-state capitalism, property-owning democracy is both prohibitively impractical and unjust on Rawlsian grounds. I first argue that property-owning democracy is economically ineffective. Even granting the assumptions of Rawlsian ideal theory, property-owning democracies generate bad incentives and face severe information problems in comparison to more market-friendly welfare states. Further, in nonideal theory the motivations of political officials and citizens will likely be corrupted by the temptation to abuse the awesome state power at their disposal. Second, I argue that property-owning democracy is unjust relative to welfare-state capitalism. The three principles used to defend property-owning democracy-the difference principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 'political liberty' proviso-do not vindicate property-owning democracy and may even prohibit it. Welfare-state capitalism does much better. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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