Knowledge claims and context: belief.
The use of 'S knows p' varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: 'S knows p' is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber's context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguis...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 2; pp. 399 - 433 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=100748961&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 100748961 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2015 vid: 172 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 100748961 10.1007/s11098-014-0309-9 ppf: 399 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 327KB tig: atl: Knowledge claims and context: belief. aug: au: Davis, Wayne affil: Georgetown University, Washington USA su: Belief & doubt Contextualism (Philosophy) Semantics Pragmatics Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Belief & doubt Contextualism (Philosophy) Semantics Pragmatics Theory of knowledge keyword: Belief Contextualism Epistemology cases Error theories Indexicals Invariantism Knowledge Loose use Lottery cases ab: The use of 'S knows p' varies from context to context. The contextualist theories of Cohen, Lewis, and DeRose explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses: 'S knows p' is indexical in meaning, referring to features of the ascriber's context like salience, interests, and stakes. The linguistic evidence against contextualism is extensive. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims results from pragmatic factors. One is variable strictness (Davis, Philos Stud, 132(3):395-438, ). In addition to its strict use, 'S knows p' may be used loosely to implicate that S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes. Here I explore another variable: belief about what is known. This factor is pragmatic rather than semantic in that it affects the use of 'S knows p' without affecting its truth conditions. While variation in strictness accounts for the variation in the bank, parking, and some lottery cases, variation in belief accounts for the variation in other lottery cases and the epistemology cases. Along the way, I sketch an insensitive invariantist semantics that is strict but non-skeptical, and show how it works with these pragmatic factors. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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