Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.
Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositi...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 44; no. 1; pp. 1 - 63 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=100781983&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 100781983 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2015 vid: 44 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 100781983 10.1007/s10992-013-9306-2 ppf: 1 ppct: 62 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.8MB tig: atl: Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. aug: au: Holliday, Wesley affil: Department of Philosophy, University of California, 314 Moses Hall #2390 Berkeley 94720-2390 USA su: Epistemic logic Theory of knowledge Omniscience (Theory of knowledge) Completeness theorem Modal logic sug: subj: Epistemic logic Theory of knowledge Omniscience (Theory of knowledge) Completeness theorem Modal logic keyword: Epistemic closure Epistemology Relevant alternatives Safety Sensitivity Subjunctivism Tracking ab: Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having 'competently deduced' it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do not always believe, let alone know, the consequences of what they know-a fact that raises the 'problem of logical omniscience' that has been central in epistemic logic. This paper, part I of II, is a study of epistemic closure from the perspective of epistemic logic. First, I introduce models for epistemic logic, based on Lewis's models for counterfactuals, that correspond closely to the pictures of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge in epistemology. Second, I give an exact characterization of the closure properties of knowledge according to these theories, as formalized. Finally, I consider the relation between closure and higher-order knowledge. The philosophical repercussions of these results and results from part II, which prompt a reassessment of the issue of closure in epistemology, are discussed further in companion papers. As a contribution to modal logic, this paper demonstrates an alternative approach to proving modal completeness theorems, without the standard canonical model construction. By 'modal decomposition' I obtain completeness and other results for two non-normal modal logics with respect to new semantics. One of these logics, dubbed the logic of ranked relevant alternatives, appears not to have been previously identified in the modal logic literature. More broadly, the paper presents epistemology as a rich area for logical study. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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