Charles Peirce's Arguments for the Non-probabilistic Validity of Induction.
Examines the arguments of Charles Sanders Peirce for the non-probabilistic validity of induction. Details of Peirce's notion of validity; Notion of self-correcting nature of induction; Discussion on the notion of truth which affects the validity of inductive method.
| Publicado en: | Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 3; no. 1; pp. 24 - 40 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Indiana University Press
Spring1967
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Examines the arguments of Charles Sanders Peirce for the non-probabilistic validity of induction. Details of Peirce's notion of validity; Notion of self-correcting nature of induction; Discussion on the notion of truth which affects the validity of inductive method. |
|---|