Charles Peirce's Arguments for the Non-probabilistic Validity of Induction.

Examines the arguments of Charles Sanders Peirce for the non-probabilistic validity of induction. Details of Peirce's notion of validity; Notion of self-correcting nature of induction; Discussion on the notion of truth which affects the validity of inductive method.

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 3; no. 1; pp. 24 - 40
Main Author:	Cheng, Chung-Ying
Format:	Article
Published:	Indiana University Press Spring1967
Subjects:	Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Induction (Logic) Truthfulness & falsehood Truth Philosophy
Online Access:	View this record in EBSCOhost

Description
Summary:	Examines the arguments of Charles Sanders Peirce for the non-probabilistic validity of induction. Details of Peirce's notion of validity; Notion of self-correcting nature of induction; Discussion on the notion of truth which affects the validity of inductive method.