Nonsense Made Intelligible.
My topic is the relation between nonsense and (un-)intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy (sct. 1). I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic unde...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 80; pp. 111 - 137 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2015 Supplement
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101048137&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101048137 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2015 Supplement vid: 80 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 101048137 10.1007/s10670-014-9662-5 ppf: 111 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 264KB tig: atl: Nonsense Made Intelligible. aug: au: Glock, Hans-Johann affil: Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 43 8044 Zurich Switzerland su: Meaninglessness (Philosophy) Truthfulness & falsehood Idiolect Semantics Linguistics Grammar Comprehension sug: subj: Meaninglessness (Philosophy) Truthfulness & falsehood Idiolect Semantics Linguistics Grammar Comprehension ab: My topic is the relation between nonsense and (un-)intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy (sct. 1). I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding (sct. 2). Secondly, I shall consider the negative case-different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense (sct. 3-4). Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the austere conception of nonsense propounded by the New Wittgensteinians (scts. 5-6); the 'no nonsense position' which roundly denies that there are cases of nonsense-Chomsky's semantic anomalies or Ryle's category mistakes-that are grammatically well-formed, without even having the potential for being used to make a truth-apt statement (scts. 7-8); the individualistic conception of language and of semantic mistakes championed by Davidson (scts. 9-10). All three positions, I shall argue, ignore or deny combinatorial nonsense, the fact that perfectly meaningful sentence-components can be combined in a way that may be grammatical, yet without resulting in a sentence that is itself 'meaningful', i.e. endowed with linguistic sense. At a more strategic level, the first and the third position deny or ignore that natural languages are communal historical practices that go beyond idiolects and the employments of expressions in specific contexts and that are guided by semantic rules-standards for the meaningful use of words. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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