Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment.
We contribute to a growing literature that examines the relationship between the nature of strategic interaction and collusive behavior. We present results from a repeated Cournot duopoly experiment with treatments in which quantity choices are either strategic complements or substitutes. The initia...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 633 - 653 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=101158511&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 101158511 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2015 vid: 81 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 101158511 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.187 ppf: 633 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 278KB tig: atl: Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment. aug: au: Anderson, Lisa R. Freeborn, Beth A. Hulbert, Jason P. affil: College of William and Mary, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20580. USA su: Capitalism Trade regulation Collusion Antitrust law Crony capitalism sug: subj: Capitalism Trade regulation Collusion Antitrust law Crony capitalism keyword: C9 D4 L1 C9 D4 L1 ab: We contribute to a growing literature that examines the relationship between the nature of strategic interaction and collusive behavior. We present results from a repeated Cournot duopoly experiment with treatments in which quantity choices are either strategic complements or substitutes. The initial underlying demand function allows for direct comparison with previous work utilizing a Bertrand duopoly setting. We find some evidence of collusion in the substitutes treatment, but no collusion in the complements treatment. We study an additional substitutes treatment to control for the absolute slope of the reaction functions across treatments, where we again find evidence of collusive behavior. However, using an alternate demand function parameterization where the goods are less closely related, we find no evidence of collusive behavior in either the substitutes or the complements treatment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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