Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/ n.
This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal 'Law of 1/ n' and 'Leviathan' theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized go...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 742 - 769 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=101158514&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 101158514 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2015 vid: 81 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 101158514 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.075 ppf: 742 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 302KB tig: atl: Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/ n. aug: au: Crowley, George R. affil: Center for Political Economy, 137C Bibb Graves Hall, Troy University, Troy, AL 36082, USA su: Economic competition Intergovernmental cooperation Public administration Interorganizational relations International agencies Interagency coordination sug: subj: Economic competition Intergovernmental cooperation Public administration Interorganizational relations International agencies Foreign affairs Other General Government Support Interagency coordination keyword: H11 H72 H77 H11 H72 H77 ab: This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal 'Law of 1/ n' and 'Leviathan' theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/ n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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