Presentism and the Experience of Time.
Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphys...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 34; no. 1; pp. 265 - 276 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101228276&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101228276 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2015 vid: 34 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 101228276 10.1007/s11245-014-9272-5 ppf: 265 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 216KB tig: atl: Presentism and the Experience of Time. aug: au: Dorato, Mauro affil: Department of Philosophy, Communication and Performing Arts, Section of Philosophy, Via Ostiense 234 00144 Rome Italy su: Presentism (Philosophy) Eternity Philosophy of time Phenomenology Extension (Philosophy) sug: subj: Presentism (Philosophy) Eternity Philosophy of time Phenomenology Extension (Philosophy) keyword: Eternalism Extensional models Phenomenology of time Presentism Retentional models ab: Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a discrete present that, however, suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology (besides the physics) of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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