This paper surely contains some errors.
The preface paradox can be motivated by appealing to a plausible inference from an author's reasonable assertion that her book is bound to contain errors to the author's rational belief that her book contains errors. By evaluating and undermining the validity of this inference, I offer a resolution...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 4; pp. 1013 - 1030 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2015
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101448333&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101448333 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2015 vid: 172 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 101448333 10.1007/s11098-014-0335-7 ppf: 1013 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 197KB tig: atl: This paper surely contains some errors. aug: au: Kim, Brian affil: The Ohio State University, Columbus USA su: Literary errors & blunders Books Fallibility Fallibilism Literary criticism sug: subj: Literary errors & blunders Books Fallibility Fallibilism Literary criticism keyword: Evidentiality Preface paradox Rational belief ab: The preface paradox can be motivated by appealing to a plausible inference from an author's reasonable assertion that her book is bound to contain errors to the author's rational belief that her book contains errors. By evaluating and undermining the validity of this inference, I offer a resolution of the paradox. Discussions of the preface paradox have surprisingly failed to note that expressions of fallibility made in prefaces typically employ terms such as surely, undoubtedly, and bound to be. After considering what these terms mean, I show that the motivating inference is invalid. Moreover, I argue that a closer consideration of our expressions of fallibility suggest that epistemically responsible authors would not be rational to believe that their books contains errors. I conclude by considering alternative expressions of fallibility that employ terms such as possible and probable, and discuss the role that expressions of fallibility play in conversation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|