CAUSAL THEORIES OF MENTAL CONTENT: WHERE IS THE 'CAUSAL ELEMENT' AND HOW DOES IT MAKE INTENTIONALITY RELATIONAL?

This paper has two interrelated aims. The primary aim is to specify the character of philosophical theories of mental content that are usually classified as 'Causal Theories of Intentionality', 'Causal Theories of Representation', or 'Causal Theories of Mental Content' (CTs). More specifically, the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Problems / Problemos Vol. 87; pp. 19 - 31
Autor principal:	Gilaitis, Mindaugas
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Vilnius University 2015
Materias:	Content (Psychology) Causation (Philosophy) Naturalism Intentionality (Philosophy) Representation (Philosophy)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost