LAIKINĖS SĄMONĖS INTENCIONALUMAS LEVINO IR WALDENFELSO FENOMENOLOGIJO.
The paper analyses the problem of intentionality in Levinas's and Waldenfels's phenomenology. By offering the critiques of intentionality and living present, Levinas traces the problem of Husserl's phenomenology which raises when he solves the problem of the giveness of the other. Levinas believes t...
| Published in: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 87; pp. 31 - 44 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Vilnius University
2015
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101706868&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101706868 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2015 vid: 87 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 101706868 ppf: 31 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: LAIKINĖS SĄMONĖS INTENCIONALUMAS LEVINO IR WALDENFELSO FENOMENOLOGIJO. aug: au: Valinskaitė, Vijolė affil: Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius sug: keyword: alterity intentionality phenomenology temporality Waldenfels alterity fenomenologija intencionalumas intentionality kitybė laikiškumas Levinas phenomenology temporality Waldenfels Waldenfelsas ab: The paper analyses the problem of intentionality in Levinas's and Waldenfels's phenomenology. By offering the critiques of intentionality and living present, Levinas traces the problem of Husserl's phenomenology which raises when he solves the problem of the giveness of the other. Levinas believes that the giveness of the other already as the meaning determines the being of the consciousness as closed, self-sufficient structure which conditions the impossibility of appearance of alterity. By seeking to ground the possibility of the alterity's appearance, Levinas defines consciousness not by intentionality but unintentionality. Precisely the description of consciousness by unintentionality uncloses an approach to radical alterity, which, on the one hand, lets to define consciousness itself as un-synthesized rupture, and on the other hand, brings us back to the problem of intentionality by raising the question of its significance in grounding any experience of the consciousness. The appearance of alterity, although differently than the meaning, implicates its appearance already as "something", therefore in the phenomenology of Waldenfels the problem of alterity is approached not by refusing intentionality but by rethinking it. By appealing to rethinking of intentionality Waldenfels interprets the appearance of alterity also as unsynthesized rupture but in the bounds of intentional consciousness. Straipsnyje nagrinėjama intencionalumo problema Levino ir Waldenfelso fenomenologijoje. Pateikdamas intencionalumo ir gyvosios dabarties kritiką, Levinas fiksuoja Husserlio fenomenologijos problemą, iškylančią sprendžiant kito duoties klausimą. Levino įsitikinimu, kito kaip jau turinčio kito prasmę duotis lemia sąmonės kaip uždaros, sau pakankamos struktūros buvimą, implikuojantį bet kokios sąmonės atžvilgiu esančios kitybės pasirodymo negalimumą. Siekdamas pagrįsti kitybės pasirodymo galimybę, Levinas apibrėžia sąmonę ne intencionalumu, bet neintencionalumu. Būtent sąmonės apibrėžimas neintencionalumu atveria prieigą prie radikalios ateities laiko kitybės, kuri, viena vertus, pačią sąmonę leidžia fiksuoti kaip nesusintetinamą trūkį, kita vertus, grąžina prie intencionalumo problemos, iškeldama jo svarbos klausimą grindžiant bet kokią sąmonės patirtį. Kitybės, nors ir kitaip nei prasmės, pasirodymas implikuoja jos jau kaip „ko nors“ pasirodymą, todėl Waldenfelso fenomenologijoje prie Levino iškeltos kitybės problemos yra grįžtama ne atsisakant intencionalumo sampratos, bet ją permąstant. Remdamasis intencionalumo sampratos permąstymu, Waldenfelsas pasirodžiusią kitybę interpretuoja taip pat kaip nesusintetinamą trūkį, tačiau intencionalioje sąmonėje. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Lithuanian refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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