The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics.
Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign...
| Published in: | Journal of Development Studies Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 116 - 133 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Feb2015
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=101714327&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 101714327 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220388 JDS jtl: Journal of Development Studies issn: 00220388 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2015 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 101714327 10.1080/00220388.2014.968138 ppf: 116 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 101714327 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 101714327 tig: atl: The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics. aug: au: Sandefur, Justin Glassman, Amanda affil: Center for Global Development, WashingtonDC, USA su: Africa Economics Education Government aid Vaccination Household surveys sug: subj: Economics Education Government aid Vaccination Household surveys Africa Educational Support Services All Other Miscellaneous Schools and Instruction Administration of Education Programs Administration of Public Health Programs ab: Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid programme rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrolment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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