Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian.
According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, ), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 80; no. 2; pp. 403 - 433 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2015
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101735595&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101735595 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2015 vid: 80 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 101735595 10.1007/s10670-014-9649-2 ppf: 403 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 418KB tig: atl: Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian. aug: au: Masterton, George affil: Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagård 222 22 Lund Sweden su: Equivocation Bayesian analysis Objectivism (Philosophy) Density functionals Probability theory sug: subj: Equivocation Bayesian analysis Objectivism (Philosophy) Density functionals Probability theory keyword: Calibration Entropy maximization Jon Williamson Objective Bayesianism ab: According to Williamson (In defense of objective Bayesianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, ), the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson's prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson's calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson's original proposal. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|