Groupthink.
How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-bo...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 5; pp. 1287 - 1310 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
May2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101830600&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101830600 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2015 vid: 172 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 101830600 10.1007/s11098-014-0350-8 ppf: 1287 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 449KB tig: atl: Groupthink. aug: au: Russell, Jeffrey Hawthorne, John Buchak, Lara affil: Magdalen College, University of Oxford, Oxford UK University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley USA su: Group decision making Decision making Choice (Psychology) Belief change Group process sug: subj: Group decision making Decision making Choice (Psychology) Belief change Group process keyword: Conditionalization Credence aggregation Disagreement Formal epistemology Social epistemology ab: How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-book arguments that apply to individual decision-makers recommends that group credences should be updated by conditionalization. This imposes a constraint on what aggregation rules can be like. Taking conditionalization as a basic constraint, we gather lessons from the established work on credence aggregation, and extend this work with two new impossibility results. We then explore contrasting features of two kinds of rules that satisfy the constraints we articulate: one kind uses fixed prior credences, and the other uses geometric averaging, as opposed to arithmetic averaging. We also prove a new characterisation result for geometric averaging. Finally we consider applications to neighboring philosophical issues, including the epistemology of disagreement. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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