On "Minimal Model Explanations": A Reply to Batterman and Rice.
Batterman and Rice offer an account of "minimal model explanations" and argue against "common features accounts" of those explanations. This paper offers some objections to their proposals and arguments. It argues that their proposal cannot account for the apparent explanatory asymmetry of minimal m...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 82; no. 2; pp. 292 - 306 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=101962272&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 101962272 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2015 vid: 82 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 101962272 10.1086/680488 ppf: 292 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 327KB tig: atl: On "Minimal Model Explanations": A Reply to Batterman and Rice. aug: au: Lange, Marc su: Philosophy of science Scientific method Explanation Causation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Philosophy of science Scientific method Explanation Causation (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge ab: Batterman and Rice offer an account of "minimal model explanations" and argue against "common features accounts" of those explanations. This paper offers some objections to their proposals and arguments. It argues that their proposal cannot account for the apparent explanatory asymmetry of minimal model explanations. It argues that their account threatens ultimately to collapse into a "common features account." Finally, it argues against their motivation for thinking that an explanation appealing to "common features" would have to explain the common features' own prevalence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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