The systematicity challenge to anti-representational dynamicism.
After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must fa...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 3; pp. 701 - 723 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102270566&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 102270566 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2015 vid: 192 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 102270566 10.1007/s11229-014-0597-9 ppf: 701 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 674KB tig: atl: The systematicity challenge to anti-representational dynamicism. aug: au: Verdejo, Víctor affil: Department of Philosophy, University College London, Gower Street London WC1E 6BT England su: Representation (Philosophy) Sensorimotor integration Cognition Culture Psychology sug: subj: Representation (Philosophy) Sensorimotor integration Cognition Culture Psychology keyword: Behavioral systematicity Dynamicism Levels of explanation Representation Systematicity challenge ab: After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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