A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE.
The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, ther...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 39 - 63 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102349926&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 102349926 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2014 vid: 24 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 102349926 10.1111/phis.12025 ppf: 39 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 142KB tig: atl: A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE. aug: au: Brogaard, Berit affil: University of Miami su: Theory of knowledge Cognition Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophy of mind Clark, Andy Menary, Richard sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Cognition Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Philosophy of mind Clark, Andy Menary, Richard ab: The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a 'situationist-friendly virtue epistemology'. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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