EPISTEMIC ACTION, EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE, AND METACOGNITION.

How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognit...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Issues Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 364 - 393
Autor principal: Proust, Joëlle
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102349939&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 102349939
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        15336077
        1731
      jtl: Philosophical Issues
      issn: 15336077
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Oct2014
      vid: 24
      iid: 1
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        102349939
        10.1111/phis.12038
      ppf: 364
      ppct: 29
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 177KB
      tig:
        atl: EPISTEMIC ACTION, EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE, AND METACOGNITION.
      aug:
        au: Proust, Joëlle
        affil: Institut Jean‐Nicod
      su:
        Metacognition
        Epistemics
        Theory of knowledge
        Cognition
        Cognitive ability
      sug:
        subj:
          Metacognition
          Epistemics
          Theory of knowledge
          Cognition
          Cognitive ability
      ab: How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Philosophical Issues
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2014
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N