MINDS AND MORALS.

In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first--that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism--concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and m...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Issues Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 393 - 409
Autor principal: Sawyer, Sarah
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Sawyer, Sarah
        affil: University of Sussex
      su:
        Mind & body
        Conduct of life
        Moral judgment
        Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
        Internalism (Theory of knowledge)
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        subj:
          Mind & body
          Conduct of life
          Moral judgment
          Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
          Internalism (Theory of knowledge)
      ab: In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first--that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism--concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second--that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism--concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent's subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call 'moral externalism', emerges.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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