Hallucination And Imagination.
What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 93; no. 2; pp. 287 - 303 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2015
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102391692&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 102391692 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2015 vid: 93 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 102391692 10.1080/00048402.2014.984312 ppf: 287 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 134KB tig: atl: Hallucination And Imagination. aug: au: Allen, Keith affil: University of York su: Hallucinations Imagination Sensory perception Disjunction (Logic) Philosophical research sug: subj: Hallucinations Imagination Sensory perception Disjunction (Logic) Philosophical research keyword: disjunctivism hallucination imagination naïve realism naïve realism perception ab: What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive characterisation of hallucination—rather than characterising hallucinations in negative, relational, terms as mental events that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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