Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions.
Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism canno...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 5; pp. 1467 - 1494 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=102621303&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 102621303 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2015 vid: 192 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 102621303 10.1007/s11229-014-0640-x ppf: 1467 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 487KB tig: atl: Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions. aug: au: Staffel, Julia affil: Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive St. Louis 63130-4899 USA su: Coherence (Philosophy) Axioms Probability theory Bayesian analysis Ideals (Philosophy) sug: subj: Coherence (Philosophy) Axioms Probability theory Bayesian analysis Ideals (Philosophy) keyword: Bayesianism Coherence Credence Incoherence Measure Probability ab: Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to distinguish between two kinds of credence functions-coherent ones that obey the probability axioms perfectly, and incoherent ones that don't. An attractive response to this problem is to extend the framework of subjective Bayesianism in such a way that we can measure differences between incoherent credence functions. This lets us explain how the Bayesian ideals can be approximated by humans. I argue that we should look for a measure that captures what I call the 'overall degree of incoherence' of a credence function. I then examine various incoherence measures that have been proposed in the literature, and evaluate whether they are suitable for measuring overall incoherence. The competitors are a qualitative measure that relies on finding coherent subsets of incoherent credence functions, a class of quantitative measures that measure incoherence in terms of normalized Dutch book loss, and a class of distance measures that determine the distance to the closest coherent credence function. I argue that one particular Dutch book measure and a corresponding distance measure are particularly well suited for capturing the overall degree of incoherence of a credence function. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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