No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist?
A dispositional monist believes that all properties are essentially causal. Recently, an overdetermination argument has been proposed by Trenton Merricks to support nihilism about ordinary objects. I argue that this argument can be extended to target both nihilism about ordinary objects and nihilism...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Papers Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 207 - 233 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=103244462&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 103244462 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 05568641 273E jtl: Philosophical Papers issn: 05568641 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2015 vid: 44 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 103244462 10.1080/05568641.2015.1056960 ppf: 207 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 171KB tig: atl: No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist? aug: au: Bihan, Baptiste Le affil: Université de Rennes 1baptiste.le.bihan@hotmail.fr su: Monism Identity (Philosophical concept) Philosophy Merricks, Trenton Electrons Quarks sug: subj: Monism Identity (Philosophical concept) Philosophy Merricks, Trenton Electrons Quarks ab: A dispositional monist believes that all properties are essentially causal. Recently, an overdetermination argument has been proposed by Trenton Merricks to support nihilism about ordinary objects. I argue that this argument can be extended to target both nihilism about ordinary objects and nihilism about physical particles when dispositional monism is assumed. It implies that a philosopher who both endorses dispositional monism and takes seriously the overdetermination argument should not believe in the existence of physical particles. I end up by discussing possible objections. I suggest, then, that if we live in a world that is inhabited by causal properties but not by chairs and tables, then we also live in a world without electrons and quarks, a world of dispositional properties, that is, a world of causal fields. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Papers is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Papers holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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