If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.
If you're a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you're a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-e...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 7; pp. 1697 - 1722 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=103286874&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 103286874 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2015 vid: 172 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 103286874 10.1007/s11098-014-0387-8 ppf: 1697 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 508KB tig: atl: If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious. aug: au: Schwitzgebel, Eric affil: Department of Philosophy, University of California at Riverside, Riverside 92521 USA su: Consciousness Materialism Phenomenology Collective consciousness Metaphysics United States sug: subj: United States Consciousness Materialism Phenomenology Collective consciousness Metaphysics keyword: Group mind Metaphilosophy Superorganism ab: If you're a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you're a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who accepts consciousness in weirdly formed aliens ought also to accept consciousness in spatially distributed group entities. If she then also accepts rabbit consciousness, she ought to accept the possibility of consciousness even in rather dumb group entities. Finally, the United States would seem to be a rather dumb group entity of the relevant sort. If we set aside our morphological prejudices against spatially distributed group entities, we can see that the United States has all the types of properties that materialists tend to regard as characteristic of conscious beings. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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