Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists.

Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. Daniel Boisvert and Michael Ridge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 96; no. 1; pp. 39 - 53
Autor principal: Eriksson, John
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2015
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists.
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        au: Eriksson, John
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg
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        Belief & doubt
        Ethics
        Ridge, Michael
        Behavioral ethics
        Character
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          Belief & doubt
          Ethics
          Ridge, Michael
          Behavioral ethics
          Character
      ab: Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. Daniel Boisvert and Michael Ridge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an attitude towards the subject of the sentence. This article argues that even if the shift to general attitudes helps solve some of the traditional problems associated with pure expressivism, a view like Ridge's, according to which the descriptive meaning is speaker relative, turns out to have problems explaining moral disagreement.
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