A game theoretical model for location of terror response facilities under capacitated resources.
This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game mode...
| Publicado en: | Scientific World Journal pp. 742845 - 742846 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
| Formato: | research Journal Article |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ccm&AN=104012846&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ccm uiTerm: 104012846 longDbName: CINAHL Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: dissinfo: jinfo: jid: 1537744X 1BX5 jtl: Scientific World Journal issn: 1537744X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2014 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell place: Malden, Massachusetts artinfo: ui: 104012846 104012846 NLM24459446 2012459275 10.1155/2013/742845 NLM24459446 PMC3891240 104012846 ppf: 742845 ppct: 1 formats: tig: atl: A game theoretical model for location of terror response facilities under capacitated resources. aug: au: Meng, Lingpeng Kang, Qi Han, Chuanfeng Xu, Weisheng Wu, Qidi affil: Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China ; Institute of Urban Construction and Emergency Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China. sug: subj: Mathematics Models, Theoretical Resource Allocation Methods Terrorism Prevention and Control China Computer Simulation ab: This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed. The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: research Journal Article ougenre: Article language: English refInfo: holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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