Is Representation Rife?
This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief-desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biologic...
| Publicado en: | Ratio Vol. 16; no. 2; pp. 107 - 124 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=10445531&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 10445531 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00340006 D8S jtl: Ratio issn: 00340006 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2003 vid: 16 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 10445531 10.1111/1467-9329.00210 ppf: 107 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 72KB tig: atl: Is Representation Rife? aug: au: Papineau, David affil: Kings College, London su: Belief & doubt Desire Psychology Semantics (Philosophy) sug: subj: Belief & doubt Desire Psychology Semantics (Philosophy) ab: This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief-desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than beliefs and desires can also have representational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a system-relative way: such states must be ascribed varying contents when viewed as components in different biological systems. I conclude by arguing that ‘the genetic code’ does not even embody this kind of system-relative representation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Ratio is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Ratio holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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