Leibniz on Force and Absolute Motion.

I elaborate and defend an interpretation of Leibniz on which he is committed to a stronger space-time structure than so-called Leibnizian space-time, with absolute speeds grounded in his concept of force rather than in substantival space and time. I argue that this interpretation is well-motivated b...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 3; pp. 553 - 574
Autor principal: Roberts, John T.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jul2003
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: I elaborate and defend an interpretation of Leibniz on which he is committed to a stronger space-time structure than so-called Leibnizian space-time, with absolute speeds grounded in his concept of force rather than in substantival space and time. I argue that this interpretation is well-motivated by Leibniz's mature writings, that it renders his views on space, time, motion, and force consistent with his metaphysics, and that it makes better sense of his replies to Clarke than does the standard interpretation. Further, it illuminates the way in which Leibniz took his physics to be grounded in his metaphysics.
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