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The Coincidences of Time Travel.

In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that anot...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 3; pp. 574 - 590
Main Author: Dowe, Phil
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Jul2003
Subjects:
Time travel
Spacetime
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Dowe, Phil
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland
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        Time travel
        Spacetime
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          Time travel
          Spacetime
      ab: In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty in the conception of explanation implicit in Horwich's argument, time travel presents us with nothing that is inexplicable.
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    language: English
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