Radical Predictive Processing.
Recent work in computational and cognitive neuroscience depicts the brain as an ever-active prediction machine: an inner engine continuously striving to anticipate the incoming sensory barrage. I briefly introduce this class of models before contrasting two ways of understanding the implied vision o...
| Publicado en: | Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. 53; pp. 3 - 28 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2015 Supplement
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109227037&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109227037 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384283 2GW jtl: Southern Journal of Philosophy issn: 00384283 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2015 Supplement vid: 53 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 109227037 10.1111/sjp.12120 ppf: 3 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 147KB tig: atl: Radical Predictive Processing. aug: au: Clark, Andy su: Neurosciences Logical prediction Medical sciences Behavioral neuroscience Clinical neurosciences sug: subj: Neurosciences Logical prediction Medical sciences Behavioral neuroscience Clinical neurosciences ab: Recent work in computational and cognitive neuroscience depicts the brain as an ever-active prediction machine: an inner engine continuously striving to anticipate the incoming sensory barrage. I briefly introduce this class of models before contrasting two ways of understanding the implied vision of mind. One way (Conservative Predictive Processing) depicts the predictive mind as an insulated inner arena populated by representations so rich and reconstructive as to enable the organism to 'throw away the world'. The other (Radical Predictive Processing) stresses the use of fast and frugal, action-involving solutions of the kind highlighted by much work in robotics and embodied cognition. But it goes further, by showing how predictive schemes can combine frugal and more knowledge-intensive strategies, switching between them fluently and continuously as task and context dictate. I end by exploring some parallels with work in enactivism, and by noting a certain ambivalence concerning internal representations and their role in the predictive mind. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Southern Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Southern Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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