Quotational higher-order thought theory.
Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 10; pp. 2705 - 2734 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109251132&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109251132 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 172 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 109251132 10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1 ppf: 2705 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 518KB tig: atl: Quotational higher-order thought theory. aug: au: Coleman, Sam affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus Hatfield AL10 9AB UK su: Consciousness Qualia Knowledge representation (Information theory) Cognitive ability Thought & thinking Psychology sug: subj: Consciousness Qualia Knowledge representation (Information theory) Cognitive ability Thought & thinking Psychology keyword: Acquaintance Higher-order thought Representation Self-representation ab: Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies on the idea of 'quoting' sensory qualities, so is dubbed the 'quotational higher-order thought theory'. I argue that it can capture something of the idea that we are 'acquainted' with our conscious states without slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mismatch. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for mental intentionality, in favour of one based on 'embedding'. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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