Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition?
Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a mod...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 427 - 441 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109442164&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109442164 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 34 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 109442164 10.1007/s11245-013-9223-6 ppf: 427 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 489KB tig: atl: Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition? aug: au: Huebner, Bryce affil: Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington 20057 USA su: Emotions Cognition Moral judgment Affect (Psychology) Moral psychology Analogy (Linguistics) Ethics sug: subj: Emotions Cognition Moral judgment Affect (Psychology) Moral psychology Analogy (Linguistics) Ethics keyword: Affect Linguistic analogy Reinforcement learning ab: Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a modulatory role in moral cognition. But I argue that claims about the role of emotion in moral cognition frame the debate in ways that divert attention away from other plausible hypotheses. I suggest that the available data may be more plausibly explained by appeal to predictive and evaluative mechanisms, which are neither wholly affective nor straightforwardly cognitive. By recognizing this fact, we can begin to see why questions about the role of emotion in moral psychology are likely to be empirically misguided. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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