Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need to Be More than Twice Better than One?
Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong.We present a deliberately crudemodel with unfavorable hypotheses.We show that, even then, when the priority rule...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 82; no. 4; pp. 667 - 689 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109543492&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109543492 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 82 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 109543492 10.1086/682940 ppf: 667 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need to Be More than Twice Better than One? aug: au: Boyer-Kassem, Thomas Imbert, Cyrille su: Epistemic logic Epistemics Cooperative research Science Philosophy of science sug: subj: Epistemic logic Epistemics Cooperative research Science Philosophy of science ab: Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong.We present a deliberately crudemodel with unfavorable hypotheses.We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We emphasize that success is sensitive to the structure of competing communities. Our results suggest that purely epistemic explanations of the efficiency of collaborations are less plausible but have much more powerful socioepistemic versions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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