Disclosure and Information Transfer in Signaling Games.
One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are possible when the interests of those involved conflict. Perfect information transfer seems inevitable if there are physical constraints, which limit the signal repertoire of an individual, effectively m...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 82; no. 4; pp. 649 - 667 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109543499&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109543499 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 82 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 109543499 10.1086/683016 ppf: 649 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Disclosure and Information Transfer in Signaling Games. aug: au: Bruner, Justin P. su: Disclosure Knowledge transfer Communication Signals & signaling Evolution & philosophy sug: subj: Disclosure Knowledge transfer Communication Signals & signaling Evolution & philosophy ab: One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are possible when the interests of those involved conflict. Perfect information transfer seems inevitable if there are physical constraints, which limit the signal repertoire of an individual, effectively making bluffing an impossibility. This, I argue, is incorrect. Unfakeable signals by no means guarantee information transfer. I demonstrate the existence of a so-called pooling equilibrium and discuss why the traditional argument for perfect information transfer (Frank's full disclosure principle) does not hold in all cases. Additionally, I demonstrate that deception is possible at equilibrium despite the fact that signals are impossible to fake. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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