Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world.
Priority Monism (hereafter, 'Monism'), as defined by Jonathan Schaffer (Philos Rev 119:131-176, ), has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete objects are parts; the cosmos is basic-there is no objec...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172; no. 11; pp. 3101 - 3119 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=109555345&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 109555345 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2015 vid: 172 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 109555345 10.1007/s11098-015-0459-4 ppf: 3101 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 402KB tig: atl: Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world. aug: au: Tallant, Jonathan affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD UK su: Spacetime Ontology Monism Schaffer, J. Lowe, E. J. (E. Jonathan) Spatio-temporal variation sug: subj: Spacetime Ontology Monism Schaffer, J. Lowe, E. J. (E. Jonathan) Spatio-temporal variation keyword: Lowe Ontological dependence Priority monism Schaffer ab: Priority Monism (hereafter, 'Monism'), as defined by Jonathan Schaffer (Philos Rev 119:131-176, ), has a number of components. It is the view that: the cosmos exists; the cosmos is a maximal actual concrete object, of which all actual concrete objects are parts; the cosmos is basic-there is no object upon which the cosmos depends, ontologically; ontological dependence is a primitive and unanalysable relation. In a recent attack, Lowe (Spinoza on monism. Palgave Macmillan, London, pp 92-122, ) has offered a series of arguments to show that Monism fails. He offers up four tranches of argument, with different focuses. These focal points are: (1) being a concrete object; (2) aggregation and dependence; (3) analyses of ontological dependence; (4) Schaffer's no-overlap principle. These are all technical notions, but each figures at the heart of a cluster of arguments that Lowe puts forward. To respond, I work through each tranche of argument in turn. Before that, in the first section, I offer a cursory statement of Monism, as Schaffer presents it in his 2010 paper, Monism: The Priority of the Whole. I then respond to each of Lowe's criticisms in turn, deploying material from Schaffer's 2009 paper Spacetime: the One Substance, as well as various pieces of conceptual machinery from Lowe's own works (The possibility of metaphysics. Clarendon, Oxford, , ) to deflect Lowe's (Spinoza on monism. Palgave Macmillan, London, pp 92-122, ) attacks. In the process of defending Monism from Lowe (Spinoza on monism. Palgave Macmillan, London, pp 92-122, ), I end up offering some subtle refinements to Schaffer's (Philos Rev 119:131-176, ) view and explain how the resulting 'hybrid' view fares in the wider dialectic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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