DWORKINO ALTERNATYVA BERLINO VERTYBIŲ PLIURALIZMUI.

The aim of this paper is to prove that Ronald Dworkin's value monism is a reasonable alternative to Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Berlin criticized monism for the reduction of diversity of value, its tendency to dogmatism and links with totalitarianism. Dworkin rejects Berlin's conception of moni...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 88; pp. 153 - 166
Autores principales: Noreikaitė, Aistė, Jokubaitis, Alvydas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2015
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: DWORKINO ALTERNATYVA BERLINO VERTYBIŲ PLIURALIZMUI.
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          Noreikaitė, Aistė
          Jokubaitis, Alvydas
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto, Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius
      sug:
      keyword:
        Isaiah Berlin
        Ronald Dworkin
        value monism
        value pluralism
        Isaiah Berlinas
        Ronaldas Dworkinas
        vertybių monizmas
        vertybių pliuralizmas
      ab:
        The aim of this paper is to prove that Ronald Dworkin's value monism is a reasonable alternative to Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Berlin criticized monism for the reduction of diversity of value, its tendency to dogmatism and links with totalitarianism. Dworkin rejects Berlin's conception of monism and argues for a much more moderate conception of monism. This paper examines Dworkin's critique for pluralism. While opposing to the exponents of Berlin's pluralism (A. Plaw, J. Allenas, J. Gray, M. Minow and J. W. Singer), it argues that Dworkin's moderate value monism allows us to give a better account of values than pluralism. The paper defends the position of value monism, which is most often strictly criticized in contemporary discourse of moral and political philosophy.
        Straipsnio tikslas - įrodyti, kad Ronaldo Dworkino vertybių monizmas laikytinas pagrįsta alternatyva Berlino pliuralizmui. Berlinas kritikavo monizmą dėl vertybių įvairovės redukcijos, polinkio į dogmatizmą ir sąsajų su totalitariniais režimais politikoje. Dworkinas atmeta Berlino monizmo sampratą ir pateikia daug nuosaikesnės vertybių monizmo koncepcijos variantą. Rekonstruojant Dworkino išdėstytą pliuralizmo kritiką ir oponuojant Berlino pliuralizmo šalininkams - A. Plaw, J. Allenui, J. Gray'ui, M. Minow ir J. W. Singeriui - įrodinėjama, kad nuosaikus Dworkino vertybių monizmas leidžia geriau suprasti vertybes nei pliuralizmas. Straipsniu siekiama ginti šiuolaikiniame moralės ir politikos diskurse nepopuliarią ir dažniausiai aštriai kritikuojamą monizmo poziciją.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: Lithuanian
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