Presentism and Einstein's Train of Thought: Reply to Brogaard and Marlow.

It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (SR) account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow (Analysis 73:635-642, ) argued that presentism...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 80; no. 5; pp. 1023 - 1030
Autor principal: White, V.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110338938&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 110338938
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Oct2015
      vid: 80
      iid: 5
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        110338938
        10.1007/s10670-014-9695-9
      ppf: 1023
      ppct: 7
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 329KB
      tig:
        atl: Presentism and Einstein's Train of Thought: Reply to Brogaard and Marlow.
      aug:
        au: White, V.
        affil: University of Wisconsin-Manitowoc, 705 Viebahn Street Manitowoc 54220-6699 USA
      su:
        Presentism (Philosophy)
        Special relativity (Physics)
        Einstein, Albert, 1879-1955
        Relativity
        Philosophy of time
      sug:
        subj:
          Presentism (Philosophy)
          Special relativity (Physics)
          Einstein, Albert, 1879-1955
          Relativity
          Philosophy of time
      ab: It has been widely held that presentism cannot easily accommodate Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (SR) account of the relativity of simultaneity because presentism privileges successively unique times ontologically. Recently Brogaard and Marlow (Analysis 73:635-642, ) argued that presentism does not deserve the attribution of this defect because it may well be that Einstein's account of the relativity of simultaneity is defective, leaving it open to establishing a view of absolutist simultaneity friendlier to presentism. Specifically Brogaard and Marlow present an argument against one of Einstein's most famous accounts of the relativity of simultaneity, and moreover raise doubts about whether Einstein availed himself of absolutist frames in some of his explanations of relativity. I will dismiss both of these charges, and thus argue that the complaint against presentism from SR stands.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2015
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N