More Trouble with Tracing.

Theories of moral responsibility rely on tracing principles to account for derivative moral responsibility. Manuel Vargas has argued that such principles are problematic. To show this, he presents cases where individuals are derivatively blameworthy for their conduct, but where there is no suitable...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 80; no. 5; pp. 987 - 1012
Autor principal: Shabo, Seth
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Oct2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110338940&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 110338940
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Oct2015
      vid: 80
      iid: 5
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        110338940
        10.1007/s10670-014-9693-y
      ppf: 987
      ppct: 25
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 434KB
      tig:
        atl: More Trouble with Tracing.
      aug:
        au: Shabo, Seth
        affil: Philosophy Department, University of Delaware, 24 Kent Way Newark 19716 USA
      su:
        Responsibility
        Vargas, Manuel
        Conduct of life
        Ethics
        Fischer, John Martin, 1952-
        Tognazzini, Neal
      sug:
        subj:
          Responsibility
          Vargas, Manuel
          Conduct of life
          Ethics
          Fischer, John Martin, 1952-
          Tognazzini, Neal
      ab: Theories of moral responsibility rely on tracing principles to account for derivative moral responsibility. Manuel Vargas has argued that such principles are problematic. To show this, he presents cases where individuals are derivatively blameworthy for their conduct, but where there is no suitable earlier time to which their blameworthiness can be traced back. John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini have sought to resolve this problem by arguing that blameworthiness in these scenarios can be traced back, given the right descriptions of these agents' later conduct. I contend that this strategy may succeed against Vargas's particular examples, but that it fails to resolve the larger problem. After clarifying some key issues about derivative responsibility and tracing principles, I develop a case that isn't amenable to Fischer and Tognazzini's treatment. I then suggest the outlines of a compromise solution to the problem for tracing principles.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2015
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N