Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.
In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as 'rational'. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 776 - 800 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110483109&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 110483109 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2015 vid: 49 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 110483109 10.1111/nous.12025 ppf: 776 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 182KB tig: atl: Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning. aug: au: Dogramaci, Sinan affil: The University of Texas at Austin su: Logic Epistemics Communism Belief & doubt Testimony (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Logic Epistemics Communism Belief & doubt Testimony (Theory of knowledge) ab: In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as 'rational'. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of the paper, I then argue, on the basis of epistemic communism, for a view about rationality itself. I set up the argument in section 2 by saying what a theory of rational deduction is supposed to do. I claim that such a theory would provide a necessary, sufficient, and explanatorily unifying condition for being a rational rule for inferring deductive consequences. I argue in section 3 that, given epistemic communism and the conventionality that it entails, there is no such theory. Nothing explains why certain rules for deductive reasoning are rational. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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