Mixed duopoly, location choice, and shadow cost of public funds.
We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare-maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The prof...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 82; no. 2; pp. 416 - 430 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=110487431&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 110487431 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 82 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 110487431 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.153 ppf: 416 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 183KB tig: atl: Mixed duopoly, location choice, and shadow cost of public funds. aug: au: Matsumura, Toshihir Tomaru, Yoshihiro affil: Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan School of Economics, Chukyo University, 101-2 Yagoto-Honmachi, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Aichi 466-8666, Japan su: Public finance Contingent fees Investment of public funds Public investments Financial management sug: subj: Public finance Public Finance Activities Portfolio Management Contingent fees Investment of public funds Public investments Financial management keyword: H20 L13 L33 H20 L13 L33 ab: We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare-maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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