Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries.

This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the 'dominant' firms), whose firm states ar...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 46; no. 4; pp. 671 - 709
Autores principales: Benkard, C. Lanier, Jeziorski, Przemyslaw, Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Winter2015
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries.
      aug:
        au:
          Benkard, C. Lanier
          Jeziorski, Przemyslaw
          Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
        affil:
          Stanford University and NBER
          University of California at Berkeley
          Columbia University
      su:
        Economic equilibrium
        Industrial organization (Economic theory)
        Organizational behavior
        Economic models
        Econometrics
      sug:
        subj:
          Economic equilibrium
          Industrial organization (Economic theory)
          Organizational behavior
          Economic models
          Econometrics
      ab: This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the 'dominant' firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generally performs well in highly concentrated markets. We also derive error bounds for evaluating the performance of POE for cases where MPE cannot be computed.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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