Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation.
The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are in...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 93; no. 4; pp. 757 - 769 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2015
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110526622&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 110526622 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2015 vid: 93 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 110526622 10.1080/00048402.2015.1035291 ppf: 757 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 108KB tig: atl: Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation. aug: au: McDaniel, Kris affil: Syracuse University su: Proposition (Logic) Individuation (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Explanation Metaphysics sug: subj: Proposition (Logic) Individuation (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Explanation Metaphysics keyword: explanation grounding hyper-intensionality in virtue of individuation propositions ab: The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but notvice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of what. In this paper I articulate and defend a metaphysical theory of the individuation of propositions, according to which two propositions are identical just in case they occupy the same nodes in a network of invirtuation relations. Invirtuation is here taken to be a primitive relation of metaphysical explanation exemplified by propositions that, in conjunction with truth, defines the notion oftrue in virtue of. After formulating the theory, I compare it with a view that individuates propositions by cognitive equivalence, and then defend the theory from objections. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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