THE HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING ARMS RACE: FREQUENT BATCH AUCTIONS AS A MARKET DESIGN RESPONSE.

The high-frequency trading arms race is a symptom of flawed market design. Instead of the continuous limit order book market design that is currently predominant, we argue that financial exchanges should use frequent batch auctions: uniform price double auctions conducted, for example, every tenth o...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 130; no. 4; pp. 1547 - 1622
Autores principales:	BUDISH, ERIC, CRAMTON, PETER, SHIM, JOHN
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Nov2015
Materias:	Industrial organization (Economic theory) Markets Auctions Market design & structure (Economics) Finance
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost