Philosophical Error and the Economics of Belief Formation.
Recent work has demonstrated that academic research faces serious challenges. Incentives to defend publishable ideas often lead researchers astray. Despite their tendency to produce error, efforts to publish erroneous results typically help a researcher's career. In addition, errors often arise from...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 46; no. 4/5; pp. 638 - 657 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110902388&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 110902388 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 46 iid: 4/5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 110902388 10.1111/meta.12162 ppf: 638 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 138KB tig: atl: Philosophical Error and the Economics of Belief Formation. aug: au: Skene, Matthew affil: Department of Philosophy, Metropolitan State University of Denver, Auraria Campus, CN 303, Denver CO, 80204, USA su: Errors Reasoning Self-defeating behavior Research bias Delusions University research Base rate fallacies sug: subj: Errors Reasoning Self-defeating behavior Research bias Delusions University research Base rate fallacies keyword: arguments bias irrationality method research ab: Recent work has demonstrated that academic research faces serious challenges. Incentives to defend publishable ideas often lead researchers astray. Despite their tendency to produce error, efforts to publish erroneous results typically help a researcher's career. In addition, errors often arise from seemingly innocent methodological assumptions that allow researchers to believe their research is sound. This article discusses this research, as well as research into difficulties facing epistemic rationality caused by nonepistemic incentives. It then applies the lessons of this research to philosophical practice. It explains why philosophy likely suffers from these problems. It then provides an example of a widely shared methodological assumption that allows such research to be pursued and regularly published. It claims that the significance philosophers place on arguments is inappropriate, and that typical evaluations of philosophical arguments involve an instance of the base-rate fallacy. It concludes by discussing whether or not this article is self-defeating. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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